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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
G. LEININGER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
'1S. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
LWUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Appellees.: 
No. 19048 
BRIEF FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Board of 
of the Industrial Commission. The Board affirmed the 
termination of unemployment benefits for the plaintiff/ 
arpellant, Gretchen Leininger, because she attended two classes 
at the University of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board, 
an order to pay the benefits withheld, and reimbursement of the 
costs of this appeal. 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
Grethcen Leininger was emploved as a nurse at St. Marks 
lt·•spit'll in Salt Lake l'ity from July l, 1975, to January lQ, 
1 l:J2. On Februarv 5, 1982, she applied for and eventually 
receiving unemplovment compensation. Having been 
unsuccessful in obtaining emplovment, Gretchen enrnl lerl 'n 
University of Utah during the Fall, quarter. She nttPnrlPl 
two classes, five days a week, from 11:00 to 1 :nn 
She was classified as a part-time student. 1-ler cnnt inue·l 
efforts to become reemployed bore fruit when she ohtairwd 
full-time work as a nurse on November 29, 1982. She contirn1pcl 
to work full time and attend classes part time through the 
Spring, 1983 quarter at the University. Tne benefits at issue 
are those that she should have received between September 21) 
and November 29, 1982. 
The Department of Economic Security terminated Gretchen's 
unemployment compensation retroactively to September 21), lQ.'l?, 
because of her attendance at school. She appealed the 
termination to the appeals referee, who affirmed. Case No. 
82-A-4601 (Novem'Jer 9, 1982) (R. 30). The Board of Review 
remanded for further factfinding on the impact of school 
attendance on work opportunities. Decision No. 82-BR-521) (Dec. 
28, 1982) (R.21). On appeal from hearing on remand (R.12-lR), 
the Board of Review affirmed the denial of compensation to 
Gretchen. Decision 82-BR-526 Review (February 9, 198'3) (l{.7). 
ISSUES ON APPF,AL 
1. Did the Board erroneously interpret U.(.A. 
as requiring an irrebuttable presumption that all students qr2 
not able and available for work, and are 
categorically ineligible for unemplovment 
-2-
2. Was the decision of the Board arbitrary, capricious, 
dnd unsupported by substantial competent evidence? 
ARGUMENT 
P0INT I 
THE BOARD ERRED IN APPLYING AN IRREBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION THAT GRETCHEN WAS INELIGIBLE 
The second decision of the Board of Review denied 
unemployment compensation to Gretchen because she was 
(1) registered at and attending an established school, (Z) did 
'10t earn the major portion of her base period wages while 
attending school, and (3) is not attending school under 
Commission approval. Decision 82-BR-526 Review (February 9, 
1983) (R.7). In so doing, the Board adopted the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law of the appeals referee. The 
appeals referee refused to consider evidence that Gretchen was 
able and available for work. He helci that "an individual must 
first meet the eligibility requirements of Section to 
receive benefits while attending [school] before the matter of 
qvailability for work becomes a consideration. The claimant 
does not meet any of the exclusionary provisions of Section 
35-4-S(g). TI1erefore, the Representative's denial of i,enefits 
i.3 held to have been i'1 order." Decision of Appeals Referee, 
cb. 82-A-4601 (Nov. 9, 1982) (R.30). 
It was error to interpret U .. A. 35-4-5 (g) (1 '182 Supp.) 
h L·equiring the cdt2gurical >f all students from 
fur unemployment compensation. In essence, that 
-3-
applies an irrebuttable or conclusive presu".lpt:i<rn t'wt 11 l 
students are not availble for work, as requirerl hv 
§ 35-4-4(c). In reviewing questions of st1tut,nv Cl)nstn1ct'nn, 
judicial review is "plenary with no deference A.ccorjed the 
administrative determination." Salt Lake Ci.tv Corp. v. flept:. 
of Employment Security, 657 P.2d 1312, l31S (Utah 1982). The 
better interpretation is that § 35-4-5(g) is a 
presumption of unavailability for work, which can be disproved 
in a particular case with a showing by the student claimant 
that she was, in fact, primarily a member of the work force anrl 
secondarily a student. 
The fundamental role of the court in construing statutes is 
to give effect the underlying intent of the legislature. West 
Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). Sections 
35-4-5 and 35-4-4 are completely separate sections, with no 
express legislative bridge between them. To give effect only 
to the disqualifying factors in § 35-4-5, without making any 
effort to balance them with the competing interests of the 
eligibility factors in § 35-4-4, is to write 35-4-4 out of 
the code. Section 35-4-4 unequivocally establishes 
eligibility. Section 35-4-3 unequivocally states that 
persons shall receive benefits. Section 35-4-5 is equallv 
unequivocal that certain factors render a claimant 
for benefits. The statute does not expresslv state which 
section controls in the event of a conflict. 
Rather than ignore proof that a person is eligible unrler 
-4-
35-4-4, the better view is to balance the competing interests 
,,,,,Jerlying both sections. This can be accomplished by 
interpreting § 35-4-5(g) as a rebuttable presumption. In this 
•ay, effect can be given to both sections. This is one 
instance where a too literal interpretation of a statute 
creates a result that is "unreasonably confused, inoperable, 
[and] in blatant contradiction to the express purpose of the 
statute. II West Jordan v. 656 P.2d at 446. 
The unemployment compensation statute is to be 
.. liberally construed and administered to assist those who 
are attached to the work force and need a bridge between 
jobs." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Dept. of Emplovment Security, 
657 P.2d at 1315. Consistent with the ameliorative purpose of 
the Act, § 35-4-5 is to be strictly construed as a forfeiture 
statute. 
[A] statute for a forfeiture shouli be strictly 
construed, and an ambiguous or doubtful term 
should be given a construction which is least 
likely to work a forfeiture. The penal character 
of the provision should be minimized by 
excluding, rather than including, conduct not 
clearly intended to be within the provision. 
Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review, 568 727, 730 (Utah 
1977). 
The ambiguity of the statute arises when trying to 
:-econcile the ph::ases "able to work and is available for work," 
1 35-4-4(c). and "is registered at and attending an established 
school,"§ 35-4-5(g). Did the legislature intend to 
exclude each and every student, and include each 
-5-
and every person who is able and available to at the same 
time? The statute should be applied in light of reality. 
There has been a noticeable change in the tvpes of sturlents an,I 
educational courses available today. There has also been a 
sharp increase in the number of "nontrarlitional sturlents," sue'< 
as Gretchen, at today's colleges. A literal interpretation of 
§ 35-4-S(g) would exclude all full-time, part-time, dav, and 
night students. Those attending weekend outdoor recreation 
classes, correspondence study, continuing education, or even 
religious instruction classes at their church would be 
excluded. This would result even though they are otherwise 
eligible under§ 35-4-4(c). 
This court has unfortunately not taken an entirely 
consistent position in interpreting§ 35-4-5(g). In Norton v. 
Dept. of Employment Securitv, 447 P.2d 907 (Utah 1968), 
§ 35-4-5(g) was applied as a per se, categorical exclusion of 
students from eligibility. No effort was made to analyze or 
implement the purpose of the statute. Townsend v. Eoarrl of 
Review, 493 P.2d 614 (Utah 1972), took a more reasonerl approach 
to the problem. The policies behind § 35-4-S(g) were 
identified as: (1) the legislative presumption that sturlents 
are not available for and (2) to prevent the use of 
unemployment compensation as a subsidy for qn education. In 
Schultz v. Board of Review, 606 P.7d ?.S4 (Urah 
§ 35-4-5(g) was not argued or consirlered, the rlecision resterl 
entirely on whether the cippel lant in thA.t ccise '1arl proven he 
-')-
was able and available for work as defined in§ 35-4-4(c). 
T'1e General Rules of Adjudication for the Board of Review 
1dupt the position c)f the plaintiff/appellant in this case. 
i\ule 30, Able and Available, provides: 
The important factor to bear in mind is the 
evidence of school attendance and work history 
must clearly demonstrate that the claimant is 
primarily a member of the work force and only 
secondarily a student. 
Whenever a claimant begins school attendance 
after becoming unemployed, he/she is under the 
same obligation to show that the hours of school 
attendance would not require any rearrangement of 
his/her regular working hours in order to 
accommodate the school attenriance. 
Tnis requires a case by case analysis of circumstances to 
determine whether the student is eligible as being primarily 
attached to the work force. This view is consistent with 
Townsend and Schultz. The Board nevertheless changed its 
position after remand and applied a conclusive presumption. 
T'1e priiilary focus must be on availability for work. 1'1 
Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977), an 
Idaho student exemption was upheld against an equal protection 
cl1allenge. The Court held that the presumption that full-time 
Jay students are unavailable for work, and generally not 
lcJoking, ryro11ided a ;:-:ational oasis for exclu<ling them from 
unemployment benefits. However, if the of 
l:ireaks free ,Jf consider:-'ltions >bout availahility 
f," wcJrk, the rcit·Lln.d basis is gonG anri the per se exclusion 
[; ta constitutionil challenge. In other words, if 
1navailability and lack of desire to work are not the basis for 
-7-
excluding students, then the supporting rational hasis is gnne 
and the provision violates guarantees of equal rrotectinn. 
A literal interpretation of the Utah stA.tute 1-101Ild swePp 
far more broadly than the Idaho statute that was uphel1. TherP 
is no rational basis for excluding those who take one ur two 
classes in such a way as to not interfere with potential 
employment opportunities. 'Ibe exclusion would be hased solelv 
on one's status as a student rather than one who had removed 
herself from the work force. Tne two classes of unemployed are 
not coextensive. Some unemployed are therefore being penalized 
for doing an act that is not adverse to either cornmunitv morals 
or values or the interests of the former employer. 
'Ibe student class of ineligible unemployed is treated 
differently from other classes of ineligibles listed in 
§ 35-4-5. With other ineligibles, once a prima facie case for 
ineligibility is estabished, there is opportunity to rehut that 
finding with appropriate evidence. Rut once a prima facie case 
of school attendance is established, there is no further 
opportunity to prove eligibility. Students are therefore the 
only group of unemployed who have no opportunity to prove 
extenuating circumstances or facts tending to prove cnntinued 
eligibility. 'Ibere is no rational 'Jasis for such disparqte 
treatment. 'Ibe conclusive presumption therefore violates equal 
protection guarantees. 
Al lowing Gretchen the opportunitv to overcn,ne the 
presumption of unavailability and prove that she was 
-S-
employment will not subvert legislative intent. It 
will instead effectuate it. Virtually all states apply only a 
rebuttable presumption that can be overcome with proof. 
Although the student rarely succeeds, they at least have an 
opportunity to offer their proof. See, Petro v. Employment 
Division, Dept. of Human Resources, 573 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App. 
1978); Glict v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 591 P.2d 24 
(Cal. 1979); Davoren v. Iowa Employment Security Comrn'n., 277 
N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 1979); Zukauskas v. Comrnw. Unemployment Comp. 
401 A.2d 866 (Pa. Cornrow. Ct. 1979); Annotation, 31 
A.L.R.3d 891, 939-43. By refusing to consider evidence that 
Gretchen was eligible under § 35-4-4, the Commission committed 
legal error. The statute requires only a rebuttable 
presumption that can be overcome with proof of full eligibility. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD IS UNSUPPORTED BY 
COMP£TENT EVIDENCE 
The Board simply refused to consider whether Gretchen was 
eligible because of its erroneous interpretation of 
§ 35-4-5(g). Ynere were therefore no findings of fact on the 
issue of eligibility under § 35-4-4, so the decision is 
unsupported by eviJence and must be reversed. 
However, Gretchen offered substantial evidence that she was 
and available for work,§ 35-4-4(c), and therefore eligible 
unavailahility was conclusively rebutted when she testified 
-')-
that she did obtain full-time employment as a nurse whlle ln 
school, and that neither her academic or wor\ performance 
suffered. (R.13, 16-17). She reduced her school load hecause 
it was interfering with her work, thus indicating a primarv 
dedication to her work (R.16-17). Her search for employment 
did not abate because of school (R.15). a nurse, a 24-hour 
profession, she was available for work during the commonly 
accepted working hours of the profession. Cf. Schultz v. Bd. 
of Review, 606 P.2d 254 (Utah 1980). 
On the facts of this case, Gretchen does not deserve to be 
penalized for attending two college classes. She had been 
unemployed for more than nine months. There is no evidence 
that she was anything other than diligent and earnest in her 
search for new employment. She suffered the additional 
handicap of being older than the new nursing graduates against 
whom she was competing for work. It is only natural that an 
active, intelligent mind would seek intellectual challenges 
while continuing her search for work. 
Our colleges, universities, and other schools are no 
longer strictly classical academic institutions. Tl-trough 
expanded and varied course offerings, they reach out to attract 
and enrich all members of society. Schools are communitv 
cultural and social centers. Perhaps no segment of our societv 
more earnestly needs to participate, to socialize, and tn he 
motivated through challenge than the unemploved. The 
unemployed are isolated and more easily discourqged than their 
-10-
employed peers. If they can attend school part time and not 
1 l i•)\,· it tu interfere with a diligent and good faith search for 
,.irk, there is no reason to penalize their initiative. The 
unemployed who prefer to spend their off-hours watching 
television do not suffer such a penalty. 
Tne Bord may emphasize the fact that Gretchen's ultimate 
goal was to change her career. Tnat fact is irrelevant because 
the Board's decision was based entirely on her status as a 
student. It didn't matter whether she was enrolled in Russian 
or a canoeing class. That issue is now moot anyway. Gretchen 
is continuing her education on her own time and with her own 
money. There is no evidence that she is or ever was using 
unemployment compensation to finance an education. 
There was ample evidence of Gretchen's willingness and 
desire to work. Of critical importance was that she was 
attending school only part time and arranged her class schedule 
around her job. Also important is the fact that she is a nurse 
and doesn't face the 9 to 5 restraint in hours that many other 
?rofessions do. In short, her schedule is merely the reverse 
of the person who works days and goes to school nights. 
school apparently does not disqualify one from receiving 
unemployment compensation (R.37-38). There is no just reason 
to penalize a person because their profession provides equal 
1 pportunity for dav or ni3ht work . Either way, Gretchen was 
.ivai lab le for the same number of working hours. TI1e 
evidence proves that Gretchen was eligible 
-11-
for her benefits. 
CONCLUSION &.'lD RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Board erred in changing its position in the mi-ist of 
Gretchen's appeal and applying an irrebuttable presumption thAt 
she was ineligible for unemployment compensation hecause of her 
status as a student. The great weight of the evidence that was 
ignored proves that she was primarily looking and available for 
work, and only secondarily a student. The decision of the 
Board must be reversed and remanded with an order to pay 
Gretchen the unemployment compensation benefits she was 
eligible to receive from September 26 to November 29, 1982, and 
the costs of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1983. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that a true and exact copy of this brief was hand 
delivered to Floyd G. Astin and K. Allan Zabel at their offices 
at 1234 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101. Done 
this day of June, 1983. 
', ' ;. 
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::: . ,,;::. LI ta h n i!;;, t n t 
of i:!nploy1nent Security 
', c_,. 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk, IJtah Supreme Court 
IJtah State Supreme Court 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
OF UTAH 
August 25, 1983 
FILED 
Re: Case No. 19048, Leininger v. Board of Review 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
\'/r1l\er T .. l',.ird 
., en r:• ""' 
L0-11cf' L r; l'I t n 
'0'•1;'.1( 
As Counsel for the Respondent, Board of Review, in the above-
referenced case, I hereby respectfully waive Respondent's right to submit 
a Response Brief and request that the Court decide this matter on the 
rrcord, Appellant's Brief and this letter, and that such decision be expe-
dited pursuant to Section 35-4-lO(i), U.C.A. 1953. 
This request is made after a careful and thorough review of the 
record in the above-entitled matter and discussion with the members of the 
Board of Review. The General Rules of Adjudication, Able and Available,_ 
Section 40, quoted at R.0021-0022, provides that one 1vho is unemployed may 
begin school attendance and still qualify for unemployment benefits pro= 
vi ded that the hours of school attendance do not require any rearrangement 
of his/her regular working hours. In applying this Rule of Adjudication it 
appears that the pertinent facts in this case are that the claimant worked 
one and one-half years on the 3 p.m. to ll p.m. shift, prior to her separa-
tion from ernploy1nent; that her school attendance 1vas from ll a.m. to 1 p.m., 
conimencing September 28, 1982; that on November 29, 1982, the claimant began 
working for the University Hospital as a Registered Nurse from 3 p.m. to 
ll p.m.; that in January 1983 the claimant reduced her school hours because 
of an extra heavy workload. 
It is my opinion, and the Board of Review has concurred, that the 
evidence of record in this matter more clearly supports the claimant's posi-
tion that she is entitled to benefits and that the decision of the Board of 
Review is not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we request that 
the Court enter an order reversing the decision of the Board of Review and 
allowing benefits to the claimant for the period beginning September 26, 1982 
and ending November 28, 1982. It is requested that the Court expedite its 
Order so that henefits may be paid to the claimant as early as possible to 
avoirl any further delays in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
K. All an Zaber 
rap Legal .Counsel 
cc: Gretchen G. Leininger 
'
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'.' ,\'ICE: L£NTER 1::34 Soutt1 tv'.ain Street - P 0 Bo., 11600 - Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 - (801) 533-2537 
